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The Guidelines of Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, Inc.: A Measured 
Approach? 
Attempts by the judiciary to guide the search and seizure 
methodology of electronically stored information (ESI) have, until 
Comprehensive Drug Testing (CDT),1 been conservative.  Rather than 
announce sweeping reform to Fourth Amendment doctrine, the 
established procedures and rights associated with searches of physical 
documents have been applied piecemeal to the new paradigm, 
allowing the new medium to slowly be incorporated into the existing 
body of law.  This practice would hopefully lead to computers being 
in the same position as file cabinets or sealed containers: just another 
wrinkle in the rules.  However, the rapid technological shifts in ESI 
have outpaced the cautious movements of the courts, leaving the law 
governing searches of ESI in a woefully inadequate state. 
The problem with ESI searches is simple: a computer belonging to 
or being used by the target of an investigation likely contains 
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1 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT), 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 
2009) (en banc). 
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information relevant to an ongoing investigation, but the same 
computer may also store information that is irrelevant to the 
investigation and that has no criminal implications.  Nevertheless, the 
computer is seized and the relevant information is found, but in the 
course of searching the computer, the examiner stumbles upon 
information that falls into the area between the two extremes: 
irrelevant to the investigation but incriminating nonetheless.  The law 
must balance the right to privacy of the nontarget against the need for 
criminal punishment, but how should it do so? 
The traditional solution has been to treat computers as being 
analogous to physical document storage, such as file cabinets.  Under 
this method, once the incriminating information is in “plain view,” it 
is fair game for evidentiary purposes.  But unlike traditional searches, 
computers have the ability to house not only one person’s vast 
quantities of data, but thousands or millions of uninvolved third-party 
individuals’ data, as well.  For example, imagine a file cabinet that 
contained a small number of documents that were nonresponsive and 
some that were responsive.  Because the numbers are relatively small, 
the documents could be quickly sorted.  A computer, on the other 
hand, may have only one document that is responsive and millions 
that are not; thus, the potential for an invasion of privacy is far 
greater. 
The Ninth Circuit, which is the only circuit thus far to require a 
specific search protocol in ESI searches,2 purports not only to identify 
this difficult issue and its nuances but also to solve it with the 
sweeping guidelines issued in the CDT decision.3  These guidelines, 
which are described in Part II, lay out the Ninth Circuit’s expectations 
for the future of ESI searches. 
There are several valid criticisms of the CDT guidelines.  First, the 
Ninth Circuit apparently reached beyond its Article III duty in issuing 
the CDT guidelines.  CDT presented several questions to the court, 
primarily whether one particular appeal was timely filed and whether 
 
2 Other circuits have addressed this issue but have not required specific protocols.  See 
generally United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a search 
protocol requirement is unrealistic); United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(declining to require a blanket protocol); United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281 (11th 
Cir. 2007) (holding that a warrant should not have included a search protocol); United 
States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The warrant process is primarily 
concerned with identifying what may be searched or seized—–not how . . . .”). 
3 CDT, 579 F.3d at 989. 
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another appeal was controlled by the preclusive effect of two district 
court orders.4  However, the court took “the opportunity to guide our 
district and magistrate judges in the proper administration of search 
warrants.”5  It is easy to see how such a statement can be read as the 
court’s issuing an advisory opinion, a practice that is simply not 
allowed.6  Second, the CDT guidelines conflict with controlling 
authority.  This criticism is based on the CDT decision’s attempt to 
limit the extensively developed and well-settled doctrine of plain 
view.7  Also, CDT’s additional warrant requirements conflict with 
both existing precedent and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  
Third, the guidelines are unworkable.  Their implementation seriously 
compromises the ability of the government to effectively investigate 
crimes and successfully prosecute criminals because they limit the 
tools available to investigators. 
This Note analyzes the CDT guidelines in five parts.  Part I briefly 
reviews the facts of the case to provide context to the guidelines and 
their intended application.  Part II explains the basic governing law 
and concedes the point that the government failed to comply with that 
law.  Part III explores how the decision impacts magistrate judges and 
affects their ability to issue warrants.  Part IV discusses the 
government’s ability to execute warrants after CDT and the 
guidelines’ impact on cases thus far.  Part V discusses whether CDT 
should be vacated or limited to methods that are implementable and 
founded on established law. 
I 
THE CDT DECISION AND THE GUIDELINES 
In August 2002, federal authorities began investigating the Bay 
Area Lab Cooperative (BALCO) for allegedly distributing illegal 
steroids to Major League Baseball players.8  In the same year, the 
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) reached an 
 
4 Id. at 994. 
5 Id. 
6 Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102 (1982) (“We do not sit to decide 
hypothetical issues or to give advisory opinions about issues as to which there are not 
adverse parties before us.”). 
7 See CDT, 579 F.3d at 1006 (“Magistrates should insist that the government waive 
reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.”). 
8 Id. at 993. 
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agreement with Major League Baseball (MLB) to provide urine 
samples of all players for suspicionless drug testing.9  The agreement 
contractually obligated the players to provide urine samples for drug-
testing purposes.  However, all results were to be confidential and 
solely used to ascertain the pervasiveness of drug use in MLB.10  The 
tests were performed by Quest Diagnostics, Inc., and all specimens 
were kept at Quest, but Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT) 
maintained a list of tested players and their respective results.11 
In the course of its investigation, the government learned of ten 
players who had tested positive for steroids.12  Based on the probable 
cause for the ten players and the knowledge that CDT maintained a 
list of all players’ results, the government obtained a subpoena in the 
Northern District of California seeking “drug testing records and 
specimens” in CDT’s possession for all players.13  An effort was 
made to negotiate compliance, but these negotiations eventually broke 
down, prompting CDT and the MLBPA to move to quash the 
subpoena.14  On the same day the motion was filed, the government 
obtained a warrant in the Central District of California to search 
CDT’s facilities.15  However, unlike the subpoena, this warrant was 
limited to the records of the ten players for whom there was probable 
cause.16 
Included in the warrant was a provision to allow seizure of 
computer records from CDT for off-site examination and segregation 
of the evidence.17  To justify this provision, which the government 
acknowledged would include information beyond that relevant to the 
investigation, the supporting affidavit contained an introduction that 
“explain[ed] the generic hazards of retrieving” ESI without any 
information specific to the actual case.18  The court explained the 
warnings: 
 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 995. 
18 Id. 
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In essence, the government explains, computer files can be 
disguised in any number of ingenious ways, the simplest of which is 
to give files a misleading name (pesto.recipe in lieu of 
blackmail.photos) or a false extension (.doc in lieu of .jpg or .gz).  
In addition, the date might be erased or hidden; there might be 
booby traps that “destroy or alter data if certain procedures are not 
scrupulously followed”; certain files and programs might not be 
accessible at all without the proper software . . . ; there may simply 
be too much information to be examined at the site; or data might 
be encrypted or compressed, requiring passwords, keycards, or 
other external devices to retrieve.  The government also represented 
that “[s]earching computer systems requires the use of precise, 
scientific procedures which are designed to maintain the integrity of 
the evidence.”19 
Based on these foreboding warnings, the magistrate granted the broad 
seizure.  However, the warrant “contained significant restrictions on 
how the seized data were to be handled” to control the seizure, 
including review and segregation by non-investigating law 
enforcement personnel instead of the case agents.20  This segregation 
was designed to provide the case agents with only those data for 
which probable cause existed.21 
During the search of CDT’s facilities, investigators found the 
“Tracey Directory,” which included, among hundreds of other 
documents, an Excel spreadsheet containing the names of all players 
who had tested positive for steroids.22  The searching agents 
determined that it would be impractical to sift through the information 
on-site, so they removed the data for off-site review, which was 
within the limits of the warrant.23  Despite the inclusion of the 
segregation requirement in the warrant, the specifics of the warrant 
were largely ignored after seizure.24  Rather than allow computer 
personnel to isolate the information authorized in the warrant, the 
case agent immediately took control of the data.25 
Based on the information obtained by reviewing the Tracey 
Directory, the government obtained warrants to search the facilities of 
 
19 Id. (citations omitted). 
20 Id. at 995–96. 
21 Id. at 996. 
22 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT 2008), 513 F.3d 1085, 1092 
(9th Cir. 2008), rev’d en banc, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009). 
23 Id. at 1093. 
24 CDT, 579 F.3d at 996. 
25 Id. at 999. 
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CDT and Quest for information relating to all players and, in an 
apparent attempt to cover its tracks, issued subpoenas “demanding 
production of the same records it had just seized.”26  The acquisition 
of the additional inculpatory information was justified, the 
government claimed, based on the plain view observation of 
contraband.27  CDT and the MLBPA moved for return of the seized 
property pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.28  Two district court orders were issued requiring return of 
the property, although one allowed the government to retain the 
materials pertaining to the ten previously identified players.29  The 
subpoenas were also quashed in a separate order.30  All three of the 
presiding judges were unimpressed by the government’s behavior.31 
Despite the firm rebuke by the lower court, the government 
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where a panel decision was issued, 
withdrawn, and reissued.32  The panel reversed two of the lower 
courts’ orders to return the property because the MLBPA had based 
its challenge to the search on the grounds that the seizure was 
illegal.33  However, the panel also held that the government had failed 
to timely appeal the third order, binding the government to that 
order’s factual determinations.  These facts included the 
government’s failure to comply with the warrant and case law 
conditions and that it had “displayed a callous disregard for the rights 
of third parties.”34  Nevertheless, the end result was that the seizure 
was upheld.  The dissent vigorously disagreed with the decision, 
claiming, among other things, that the decision was unfounded, 
ignored factual findings of the lower courts, and would have dire 
ramifications.35 
 
26 Id. at 993. 
27 Id. at 998; CDT 2008, 513 F.3d at 1095. 
28 CDT, 579 F.3d at 993. 
29 Id. at 994. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Derek Regensburger, Comment: The Ninth Circuit’s En Banc Ruling in United States 
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. Sets New Rules for Computer Searches, but for How 
Long? 2 (2009) (available at http://works.bepress.com/derek_regensburger/2). 
33 CDT 2008, 513 F.3d 1085, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d en banc, 579 F.3d 989 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
34 CDT, 579 F.3d at 995. 
35 CDT 2008, 513 F.3d at 1116–17 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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MLBPA appealed the panel decision, and a rehearing en banc was 
granted, ironically, with none of the judges who had appeared on the 
initial panel sitting.36  Here, the positions taken in the earlier panel 
decision switched; the majority issued a scathing criticism of the 
government and ordered the property returned while the dissent 
warned of dire ramifications.37  The en banc panel reversed the 
previous panel decision and ordered return of the testing results for all 
but the ten athletes for whom there had originally been probable 
cause.38  The decision was based primarily on issue preclusion––
because the government was bound by the factual determinations of 
the order that it failed to timely appeal, the issues contained in the 
government’s appeal were already conclusively resolved.39  Thus, the 
determination by the en banc panel was largely based on procedural 
grounds, and the holding required the government to return all seized 
data not pertaining to the original ten players. 
“Had the court stopped there, this ruling would have been 
unremarkable,” 40 but the court reached far beyond the issues 
presented in the appeal.  The court went to great lengths to explore the 
underlying issues in the government’s improper behavior.  
Throughout the opinion and especially in a section titled “Concluding 
Thoughts,” the court explained that, although “[w]rongdoers and their 
collaborators have obvious incentives to make data difficult to find,    
. . . parties involved in lawful activities may also encrypt or compress 
data for entirely legitimate reasons.”41  In light of this, the interests of 
innocent parties to keep their stored information private must be 
balanced against the legitimate need of law enforcement to sweep up 
large quantities of data and sift through them for “concealed or 
disguised pieces of evidence.”42  In this process, the government 
agent reviewing the data could come across vast quantities of 
incriminating information that it could then claim fell into the plain 
view exception.43  Thus, in the absence of any limitations, there is a 
risk that any warrant for the limited seizure of ESI would 
 
36 CDT, 579 F.3d at 994. 
37 See id. at 1005–07. 
38 Id. at 1003. 
39 Id. at 997. 
40 Regensburger, supra note 32, at 2. 
41 CDT, 579 F.3d at 1004. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1004–05. 
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automatically become a general warrant for any data storage that is 
connected physically or digitally.44  The Court further speculated that 
any ESI warrant could justify the search of “computers many miles 
away, on a theory that incriminating electronic data could have been 
shuttled and concealed there.”45 
To address the perceived risks of limitless warrants, the court 
created a set of five guidelines that it hoped would “prove a useful 
tool for the future.”46  In the majority’s view, the guidelines strike a 
“delicate balance” in preserving constitutional freedoms and allowing 
prosecution of criminal activity.47  The court summarized the 
guidelines as follows: 
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance 
upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. 
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized 
personnel or an independent third party.  If segregation is to be 
done by government computer personnel, it must agree in the 
warrant application that the computer personnel will not disclose 
to the investigators any information other than that which is the 
target of the warrant. 
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of 
destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize that 
information in other judicial fora. 
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover 
only the information for which it has probable cause, and only 
that information may be examined by the case agents. 
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully 
possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing 
magistrate informed about when it has done so and what it has 
kept.48 
As it turns out, the implementation of these guidelines has created a 
tremendous problem in investigations conducted since CDT.49  The 
 
44 Id. at 1005 (“Authorization to search some computer files therefore automatically 
becomes authorization to search all files in the same subdirectory, and all files in an 
enveloping directory, a neighboring hard drive, a nearby computer or nearby storage 
media.”). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1006–07. 
47 Id. at 1007. 
48 Id. at 1006 (internal cross references omitted). 
49 See, e.g., Hugh Kaplan & Christine Mumford, Attorneys, Academics Sort Through 
Landmark Case on Computer Searches, 85 Crim. L. Rptr. 688 (BNA) (Sept.16, 2009); 
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case is now briefed for a full-court en banc rehearing, which has only 
happened three times in Ninth Circuit history, and such a review has 
never been granted.50  Despite the rehearing, these guidelines are 
currently good law in the Ninth Circuit and must be implemented and 
interpreted by courts.  This Note will show just how difficult and 
impractical that task is. 
II 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE LAW AND THE GOVERNMENT’S 
FAILURE 
Before exploring the ramifications of the CDT guidelines, a brief 
summary of the relevant law is warranted.51  After a cursory review, 
it becomes apparent that the government failed to meet its obligations 
in this case (a point the author readily concedes).  There are four areas 
of law that are especially relevant to understanding the impact of the 
CDT decision: the search warrant particularity requirement, the plain 
view doctrine, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
and the supervisory power generally. 
A.  Areas of Law Relevant to CDT 
The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant describe with 
particularity the area to be searched and the items or persons to be 
seized.52  Though initially this may appear a substantial requirement, 
it does not extend far.  For instance, the “particularity requirement 
does not include the conditions precedent to execution of the 
warrant,” nor does it require that a property owner be given the 
warrant before a search is conducted.53  Rather, the “Constitution 
protects property owners . . . by interposing, ex ante, the ‘deliberate, 
impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . .’ and by providing, ex post, 
a right to suppress evidence improperly obtained . . . .”54  Exceptions 
 
Orin Kerr, The Ninth Circuit Enacts Miranda-Like Code for Computer Search and Seizure, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 26, 2009, 1:38 PM), http://volokh.com/archives/archive 
_2009_08_23-2009_08_29.shtml#1251308337. 
50 Regensburger, supra note 32, at 13. 
51 These summaries are meant to introduce the reader to the law, but not to provide a 
fully fleshed-out view.  As the analysis progresses in later Parts, the nuances of the law 
will be explained further and citations to further reading will be provided. 
52 United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006). 
53 Id. at 98. 
54 Id. at 99 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963)). 
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to the warrant requirement, such as the plain view exception, lessen 
the impact of even these modest protections. 
Because of the unique qualities of computers, it is difficult to apply 
the plain view exception.  As one author described them, computers 
are “[p]art workshop, part file cabinet, part stereo, and part diary.”55  
Thus, there is no direct, historical plain view analogy that can be 
applied.  The plain view exception applies when searching officers 
“have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the 
course of the search come across some other article of incriminating 
character.”56  When this occurs, items not particularly described in a 
warrant may be seized if (1) the officer was lawfully in a position 
from which to view the seized object, (2) the incriminating character 
of the object was immediately apparent, and (3) the officer had a 
lawful right of access to the object.57  The second factor means that 
the officer has probable cause to believe the evidence is associated 
with criminal activity.58  The doctrine has two major limitations: it 
cannot be utilized alone (i.e., in the absence of some legitimate 
search), and the discovery of evidence must be inadvertent.59  
Consideration of the subjective intent of the officer has been heartily 
rejected.60 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure guides 
searches of ESI.  This Rule, which was substantially amended on 
December 1, 2009,61 several months after the en banc CDT decision, 
provides the requirements for a warrant, including specific provisions 
for ESI.62  The Rule states that a magistrate judge “must issue the 
warrant if there is probable cause.”63  This language is unlike the 
language authorizing requests by telephone, which states that a 
 
55 David J.S. Ziff, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer 
Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 841 (2005). 
56 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990). 
57 Id. at 134–35 (setting out the criteria for the plain view doctrine). 
58 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374–75 (1993); United States v. Stafford, 
416 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). 
59 Horton, 496 U.S. at 136 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468–69 
(1971)). 
60 Id. at 129 (“[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by applying objective 
standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the officer’s subjective state 
of mind.). 
61 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
62 See id. at (e)(2)(B). 
63 Id. at (d)(1) (emphasis added). 
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magistrate judge “may issue a warrant.”64  Thus, under Rule 41, once 
probable cause is established, the magistrate does not have the power 
to deny the warrant or to impose extra conditions, provided the 
contents of the warrant are sufficient.  The Rule also notes that, 
“[u]nless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of 
the media or information consistent with the warrant.”65  
Furthermore, when electronic storage media are seized, the inventory 
that must be returned to the court “may be limited to describing the 
physical storage media that were seized or copied.”66 
A final area of law relevant to CDT is the supervisory power of the 
courts.  The supervisory power allows the court to impose rules of 
procedure and evidence on the inferior courts.67  However, the 
supervisory power may not be used to either disregard or supplement 
binding case law68 in a way that conflicts with constitutional or 
statutory provisions.69  Rather, the power is intended only to allow 
guidance to lower courts in non-substantive areas.  With these areas in 
mind, the problems with the CDT guidelines can be better understood. 
B.  Conceding the Point That the Government Erred 
The CDT decision seems to reflect outrage at the actions of the 
government, and for good reason.  The law that should have limited 
the case agent’s behavior was in place, the warrant clearly demarcated 
the lines that could not be crossed and gave a generous process to 
retrieve relevant data, and there was plenty of breadth in the allowed 
seizures to further the investigation.  However, even these boundaries 
were not enough to deter overreaching by the government. 
As the factual recount in Part I illustrates, the government failed to 
follow the authorized procedures in this case.  The most egregious 
failure is the immediate and unauthorized review of all the seized 
information by the lead case agent, which compromised the privacy 
of numerous third-party individuals.70  The district judges below all 
 
64 Id. at (d)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 
65 Id. at (e)(2)(B). 
66 Id. at (f)(1)(B). 
67 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000). 
68 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980) (“[A court may not] disregard the 
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.”). 
69 Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985) (“Even a sensible and efficient use of the 
supervisory power . . . is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.”). 
70 CDT, 579 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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“expressed grave dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of 
the investigation, some going so far as to accuse the government of 
manipulation and misrepresentation.”71  On appeal, the government 
tried to explain its actions with the shaky logic that “the warrant 
didn’t specify that only computer personnel could examine the seized 
files.”72  The en banc court was not impressed with this argument, 
stating that such a reading “would make a mockery of [precedent] and 
render the carefully crafted safeguards in the . . . warrant a nullity.”73  
Their ire was fully revealed in the following hyperbolic example: 
Why stop at the list of all baseball players when you can seize the 
entire Tracey Directory?  Why just the directory and not the entire 
hard drive?  Why just this computer and not the one in the next 
room and the next room after that?  Can’t find the computer?  Seize 
the Zip disks under the bed in the room where the computer once 
might have been.  Let’s take everything back to the lab, have a good 
look around and see what we might stumble upon.74 
When facts such as those presented in CDT come before a court, it is 
not surprising that the court feels compelled to rectify the underlying 
issue.  And for anyone to claim that the government did not wholly 
fail to observe its obligations would be arguing an untenable position.  
Despite the stance of this Note, the author fully acknowledges that 
mistakes were made in this case and that the return of the 
nonresponsive data was proper. 
It should also be noted that CDT did establish some notable 
benefits for the future of ESI searches.  First, the decision states 
clearly that the government may not rely on boilerplate language to 
justify searches but must “fairly disclose the actual degree of such 
risks in the case presented.”75  Such a statement serves as a powerful 
reminder that prosecutors may not simply assume that all 
investigations are the same, and it will hopefully increase the 
awareness of the needs of each individual investigation.  Second, 
although the decision lacks any citation to Fourth Amendment 
precedent,76 the requirement that plain view be waived, as opposed to 
 
71 Id. at 994. 
72 Id. at 1000. 
73 Id. at 998. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1017 (Bea, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (criticizing the 
guidelines as lacking any citation to the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent). 
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stating that it does not apply, implies that Fourth Amendment 
doctrines do apply to ESI searches.  Third, there is an explicit 
acknowledgment that there is a “legitimate need to scoop up large 
quantities of data, and sift through it carefully for concealed or 
disguised pieces of evidence.”77  This recognition is important to 
ensure that warrants may continue to authorize over-seizure to be 
segregated later.78 
However, any incremental furtherance of the understanding of an 
area of the law does not excuse a court’s obligations to create laws 
that are constrained and balanced.  A tired point rings true: bad facts 
make bad law.  CDT presented a situation involving egregious 
government action, and the court responded proportionally.  The next 
Parts of this Note will show why the guidelines that emerged were 
perhaps not the best. 
III 
THE INTERPLAY OF CDT AND ESTABLISHED LAW 
The CDT decision imposes on magistrates several responsibilities 
that are simply beyond their warrant-issuing authority.  The decision 
seems to adopt the theory that, because magistrates are responsible for 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, magistrates have the 
constitutional authority to impose additional warrant requirements 
beyond those specifically listed in the Fourth Amendment or, for that 
matter, cases interpreting it.79  However, that is not the case.  In fact, 
the CDT guidelines lack foundation and conflict with much existing 
law. 
A.  Guidelines, Mandates, or Mandatory Guidelines? 
It is unclear from the CDT decision whether the guidelines are 
meant to be advisory or mandatory.  Throughout the opinion, the 
court makes remarks that suggest an unwillingness to force 
compliance: 
[W]e trust that the procedures we have outlined above will prove a 
useful tool for the future.  In the end, however, we must rely on the 
 
77 Id. at 1004. 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006) (allowing a blanket 
seizure of all computer equipment). 
79 See Susan W. Brenner, Internet Law in the Courts, J. INTERNET L., Oct. 2009, at 18, 
18. 
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good sense and vigilance of our magistrate judges . . . . Nothing we 
could say would substitute for the sound judgment that judicial 
officers must exercise in striking this delicate balance.80 
Thus, although the requirements seem to be binding, the 
magistrate’s role remains the same: ensure that the ex parte nature of 
a warrant request is conducted in a way that protects the absent 
party’s rights.81  Juxtaposed to this tentative language are more 
demanding phrases implying that compliance is required, especially 
in the guidelines themselves, such as “[m]agistrates should insist” and 
“[s]egregation and redaction must be . . . done [and the government] 
must agree.”82  This failure to identify whether the guidelines are 
mandatory or merely advisory is frustrating and has immediately 
resulted in confusion as to whether prosecutors must comply.  
Reflecting this lack of articulation, the dissent states that the 
majority’s “protocols are dicta and might be best viewed as a ‘best 
practices’ manual, rather than binding law.”83 
However, the guidelines were quickly treated as mandatory by 
issuing magistrates throughout the circuit.  Emblematic of this is a 
letter from the Chief Magistrate Judge for the Western District of 
Washington that states: “we are all required to follow the 
requirements set forth in the [en banc panel’s] decision.”84  The letter 
concludes that judges “will either modify or reject any provision that 
does not comply with [the CDT] requirements.”85  Other magistrates 
required the same.86  Thus, regardless of the Court’s intention, the 
ambiguity of CDT has resulted in lower courts’ treating the guidelines 
as mandatory.87 
 
80 CDT, 579 F.3d at 1006–07 (emphasis added). 
81 Abraham S. Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1178 (1987). 
82 CDT, 579 F.3d at 1006 (emphasis added). 
83 Id. at 1012–13 (Callahan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
84 Letter from Karen L. Strombom, Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge, W. Dist. of Wash., to 
Robert Westinghouse, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 (Oct. 1, 2009) (on 
file with author). 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 5, 
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., (Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354) 
(9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Government’s Brief] (“Magistrates and district court 
judges throughout this Circuit are treating the en banc panel’s ‘guidance’ as binding.”). 
87 See also id. at 6 (“[A] widespread consensus has emerged among judges throughout 
this Circuit that compliance is mandatory.”). 
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B.  Stepping Beyond the Issues Presented 
The CDT decision presented the en banc court with several legal 
issues.  Those issues related to the preclusive effect of district court 
orders, the timeliness of an appeal, compliance with various warrants, 
and abuses of discretion.88  Noticeably absent from the issues 
presented is anything related to the warrant process itself.  The dissent 
expressed concern, stating that “[t]he majority’s prescriptions go 
significantly beyond what is necessary for it to resolve this case.”89  
Rather than confining its opinion to the issues directly presented and 
briefed by the parties, the court issued an advisory opinion, which is 
not permitted of federal courts.90  Advisory opinions are disallowed 
because they detract from courts’ abilities to reach accurate results, as 
the adversary system must “rely on the parties to frame the issues for 
decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the 
parties present.”91  It is interesting to note that mere weeks after the 
CDT opinion was issued, the Ninth Circuit remarked that “[o]ur role 
is neither to issue advisory opinions nor to declare rights in 
hypothetical cases, but to adjudicate live cases or controversies 
consistent with the power granted the judiciary in Article III of the 
Constitution.”92  Despite these constitutional limitations, the CDT 
decision reaches issues that were never briefed nor argued and were 
unnecessary to resolve the case before it.  This overreaching caused 
Judge Bea, in dissent, to state that “the establishment of guidelines . . . 
in the manner chosen by the majority goes against the grain of the 
common law method of reasoned decision making, by which rules 
evolve from cases over time.”93 
 
88 Id. at 3–4. 
89 CDT, 579 F.3d 989, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Callahan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Government’s Brief, supra note 86, at 3 (The court 
ventured “far beyond . . . and announc[ed] what purport to be, and are being understood as, 
binding guidelines for future cases involving computer searches.”). 
90 See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (“[A] federal court has neither the 
power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of 
litigants in the case before them.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
91 Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2564 (2008); see also Princeton Univ. v. 
Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102 (1982) (“[Federal courts] do not sit to . . . give advisory 
opinions about issues as to which there are not adverse parties before [them].”). 
92 Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
93 CDT, 579 F.3d at 1018 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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C.  Beyond the Supervisory Power’s Power 
It is also unlikely that the court has the ability to impose limitations 
on magistrates’ ability to issue warrants.  Presumably, any mandate 
would be rooted in the court’s supervisory power, which allows the 
court to impose rules of procedure and evidence on the inferior 
courts.94  This basis is presumed because the CDT decision is devoid 
of any meaningful reference to the source of its authority to impose 
guidelines on magistrate judges.95  The supervisory power, while 
regularly invoked by courts to alter procedure to their ends, is 
certainly a difficult power to justify, and it is not surprising that the 
decision chooses to avoid explicit reference to this source.96 
Assuming the supervisory power is the source of authority for 
imposing the CDT guidelines does not enhance their effectiveness.  
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the supervisory power 
cannot be used to supplement Fourth Amendment protections.97  
Plain view seizures, which CDT denies the government by requiring 
the doctrine be waived in ESI investigations,98 are firmly rooted in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and are well established as 
constitutionally permissible.99  Indeed, the CDT decision 
acknowledges the application of the doctrine, but it is concerned 
about its application to ESI searches.100  The Supreme Court has 
made clear that when officers “in the course of [a] search come across 
some other article of incriminating character,” the plain view doctrine 
allows its seizure.101  Thus, a seizure made pursuant to plain view is 
not a violation of a person’s constitutional rights, and, therefore, it 
cannot be limited by the supervisory power.  To do so “would amount 
 
94 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000). 
95 See CDT, 579 F.3d at 1013 (Callahan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) 
(stating that the guidelines are created “without citing to legal authority that would support 
these new rules”); Regensburger, supra note 32, at 3 (“Perhaps more surprising, however, 
was the complete lack of legal analysis offered for these sweeping new rules.”). 
96 See generally Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006) (exploring the nature, origin, and validity of the supervisory 
power). 
97 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 (1980). 
98 CDT, 579 F.3d at 998. 
99 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
100 See CDT, 579 F.3d at 1004–05. 
101 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990). 
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to a substitution of [a lower court’s] judgment for the controlling 
decisions of [the Supreme] Court.”102 
D.  Conflicts with the Rule 41 Warrant Requirements 
The CDT guidelines also directly conflict with the recently adopted 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Although CDT 
did not conflict at the time it was decided, a new Rule 41 was adopted 
about three months after the decision.103  Because the Rules carry the 
force of the Supreme Court, all laws in conflict with the Rules have 
no further force or effect.104 
The conflicts between the guidelines and Rule 41 are glaring.  The 
CDT guidelines state “the government must provide the issuing 
officer with a return disclosing precisely what data it has obtained as a 
consequence of the search.”105  Meanwhile, for ESI seizures, Rule 41 
states that “the inventory may be limited to describing the physical 
storage media that were seized or copied.”106  Thus, the two 
authorities conflict on what is required in an inventory of seized 
items.  Similarly, CDT requires that, absent specific authorization 
otherwise, officers must return or destroy all copies of seized data107 
while Rule 41 states that “[t]he officer may retain a copy of the 
electronically stored information that was seized or copied.”108  This 
conflict, the logic of which is questioned in Part IV.B, is also direct.  
Once a rule of procedure is adopted, all laws in conflict with that rule 
have no further force or effect.109  Thus, given that the CDT 
guidelines and Rule 41’s requirements are in direct and unworkable 
 
102 Government’s Brief, supra note 86, at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting Payner, 447 
U.S. at 737). 
103 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
104 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (“All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no 
further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”); Clinton v. City of New York, 
524 U.S. 417, 446 n.40 (1998) (“Congress itself made the decision to repeal prior rules 
upon the occurrence of a particular event––here, the promulgation of procedural rules by 
this Court.”). 
105 CDT, 579 F.3d at 1000–01. 
106 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(B) (emphasis added) (detailing the inventory 
requirement). 
107 CDT, 579 F.3d at 1000 (“The government may not retain copies of such returned 
data, unless it obtains specific judicial authorization to do so.”). 
108 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(B). 
109 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
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conflict, the former necessarily are deprived of their force in those 
areas that conflict. 
Even if Rule 41 did not displace the CDT guidelines, the warrant 
requirement combined with Supreme Court precedent effectively 
contradicts the CDT guidelines with respect to the requirement of 
specifics in the search protocol.  The guidelines require magistrates to 
make demands of the government beyond establishing probable 
cause.  Nothing in the Constitution requires specificity in the manner 
of a warrant’s execution; the particularity requirement applies only to 
what is searched and seized.110  Efforts to expand the particularity 
requirement have been rejected.111  A modicum of support can be 
found by claiming that the extra requirements ensure that privacy 
intrusions are minimized;112 however, there is no suggestion that such 
safeguards are required or possible ex ante or that the traditional role 
of ex post review should be abandoned.  Thus, the CDT guidelines 
seem to buck the established law by requiring more of the warrant 
process, despite the Supreme Court’s “repeated[] refus[al] to declare 
that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”113 
The Tenth Circuit case of United States v. Brooks is exemplary of 
courts’ study of the particularity requirement and an affirmation of its 
limits.114  The appellant in Brooks claimed that a warrant that led to 
the discovery of child pornography on his computer was not 
sufficiently particular because it did not describe the search 
methodology to be employed.115  The Court first enunciated that “the 
[particularity] requirement ensures that the search will be carefully 
tailored to its justifications, and [it] will not take on the character of 
the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to 
 
110 United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006) (“[The Fourth Amendment] 
specifies only two matters that must be particularly describ[ed] in the warrant: the place to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotations omitted).  For a contrary view, see Brenner, supra note 79, at 18, which argues 
that magistrates can impose requirements on the government’s execution of a warrant to 
ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 
111 See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
112 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (“[R]esponsible officials, 
including judicial officials, must take care to assure that [searches for papers] are 
conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.”). 
113 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995). 
114 United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2005). 
115 Id. at 1251. 
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prohibit.”116  Beyond stating with particularity the “objects of their 
search,” though, there is no requirement that seizing officers have a 
search protocol listed in the warrant.117  The Tenth Circuit did make 
clear that in cases 
[w]here officers come across relevant documents so intermingled 
with irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the 
site, the officers may seal or hold the documents pending approval 
by a magistrate. . . . The magistrate should then require officers to 
specify in a warrant which type of files are sought.118 
This conclusion is logical as it enables officers specifically 
searching for evidence of a crime to undertake any means to find that 
evidence during their search, but it also limits officers should they 
stumble across irrelevant but incriminating material.  Rather than try 
to limit the scope of the warrant by limiting the items, the scope is 
limited by subject matter.119 
The CDT decision does not respect the same limits on the 
particularity requirement.  Instead, it demands that particularity be 
employed in an area that, as Part IV explains, is not conducive to such 
ex ante descriptions. 
IV 
THE EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Prior to the CDT decision, there was leeway in warrants that 
facilitated investigations and led to convictions of parties who were, 
perhaps, not the initial target.  Now, in response to CDT, former 
practices and procedures that were largely viewed as acceptable 
cannot be employed.  In some U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the guidelines 
have had a chilling effect on warrant applications or resulted in 
deferral to state authorities that are not bound by the requirements.  
This decreased ability to effectively execute warrants is a direct by-
product of the guidelines. 
 
116 Id. (quoting United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 851, 863 (10th Cir. 2005)) (citing 
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)). 
117 Id. 
118 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 
119 See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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A.  Limitations on Off-Site Searching After CDT 
One of the necessities of ESI searches is removal of the data 
storage device for off-site searching.  After CDT, removal for off-site 
searching is still permitted, but it is severely restricted.  The Ninth 
Circuit recognized that removal for off-site searches is already 
generally allowed by the showing of the impracticality of copying the 
data within a reasonable time without compromising the data.120  The 
reasonable time considerations depend on several factual issues: size 
of memory, complexity of organization, encryption, passwords, type 
of documents sought, and resources available.121  This allowance 
makes sense as officers executing a search warrant may have only a 
rudimentary understanding of computer technology; they may be 
unequipped to make advanced decisions regarding inculpatory 
materials.122  Rather, their familiarity with computers may be like 
their familiarity with drugs: they know what is a crime but not the 
details.123  The CDT guidelines require that any seized evidence that 
is nonresponsive to the warrant must be returned or destroyed within 
a time specified in the warrant, which should be as soon as 
practicable.124 
However, this timeline fails to consider several issues.  First, there 
is direct conflict with Rule 41, which allows the government to retain 
a copy of seized information.125  Second, it ignores the reality that 
investigations often expand to include areas that were previously 
thought to be innocuous.  If the government is unable to retain copies 
of seized media, there is a realistic fear that the later expansion of an 
investigation may be impossible if the evidence is no longer 
recoverable (such as when the defendant destroys the only copy).  In 
 
120 CDT 2008, 513 F.3d 1985, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008) rev’d en banc, 579 F.3d 989 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
121 Robert H. Bohn, Jr. & Lynn S. Muster, The Dawn of the Computer Age: How the 
Fourth Amendment Applies to Warrant Searches and Seizures of Electronically Stored 
Information, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 63, 72 (2003). 
122 See Lanny L. Newville, Cyber Crime and the Courts––Investigating and 
Supervising the Information Age Offender, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2001, at 11 (finding a 
deficiency in law enforcement’s ability to investigate computer crimes). 
123 Id. at 12. 
124 CDT, 579 F.3d 989, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
125 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(B). 
 2010] The Guidelines of Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 371 
fact, “[t]he [state] is obligated to preserve exculpatory evidence.”126  
Along the same lines, retaining a copy allows the government to 
prove that no information on the seized media was destroyed or not 
provided to the defendant in violation of the government’s obligation 
under Brady to turn over exculpatory material.127 
B.  Misstatements of Technology and Misunderstandings of Ability 
The CDT decision misunderstands the technology employed in 
searching ESI.  In its decision, the court states that hashing tools exist 
that are sophisticated enough to allow searches without opening 
files.128  Hash values are created by taking a known string of data bits 
and using a mathematical function to generate a value.129  The created 
hash value cannot be reassembled into the file from which it was 
created; therefore, the hash value reveals nothing about the 
information in the original file itself.130  The court, though, suggests 
that hashing tools could lead to a tailored search that is limited to only 
those files that meet the specific search criteria––in CDT, the ten 
players in the warrant.131  However, because hashing tools allow an 
investigator to find only those files with known hash values, “hash 
calculations disclose nothing” about a file’s contents.132  Thus, the 
usefulness of hash values is confined to those instances where the 
values derived from seized files can be compared with the values 
from known contraband;133 otherwise, the hash value is worthless.  If 
the hashing tools were to be successfully employed in the CDT case, 
investigators would necessarily already have the files because they 
would need to derive the values from them for comparison.  
Furthermore, if the point of the CDT guidelines is to encourage the 
 
126 Bohn & Muster, supra note 121, at 78 (discussing the need to preserve ESI evidence 
even after completion of a forensic search). 
127 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing that a prosecutor’s 
withholding of exculpatory material violates the requirement of due process). 
128 CDT, 579 F.3d at 999. 
129 Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119 
HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 39 (2005). 
130 Id. at 38–39. 
131 CDT, 579 F.3d at 999. 
132 Salgado, supra note 129, at 42. 
133 For this reason, hash values are very useful in child pornography cases because there 
are known hash value sets (derived from known child pornography) to which the seized 
files’ values can be compared.  Id. at 45–46. 
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use of hashing tools, the result will be an increase in the invasion of 
privacy, as each matching value would reveal that a certain file was 
on the computer being searched, regardless of whether it is within the 
scope of the warrant.134 
The court also demands that a specific search protocol be spelled 
out in the warrant affidavit.135  While it is practical and required to 
include a methodology in the warrant pertaining to the segregation of 
relevant and innocuous data,136 it is impossible to know beforehand 
what methods will be used to actually search for the relevant data.137  
It is interesting to note that the Ninth Circuit itself has acknowledged 
this reality: “[t]o require such a pinpointed computer search, 
restricting the search to [a particular] program or to specific search 
terms, would likely [fail] to cast a sufficiently wide net to capture the 
evidence sought.”138  As discussed in Part IV.D on decisions 
interpreting CDT, this is a difficult standard for courts to follow, and 
not just because of the magistrate’s limited ability to evaluate the 
proper protocol.139  It fails to recognize that the threats placed in a 
warrant, which the court refers to as part of a “strong generic 
case,”140 could be present in any, all, or none of the electronic devices 
seized.  In fact, a process of trial and error is often required to 
determine the structure and organization of files, including how a 
target may have hidden inculpatory files.141  The simplest example of 
the inability to define a methodology beforehand is the inability to 
know if the encountered computer will be using a Windows, Apple, 
or Linux-based operating system.  Because each operating system 
uses unique file structures, the methods are necessarily different; thus, 
in the absence of a generic contingency for all possibilities, spelling 
out the method is not feasible. 
 
134 Id. 
135 CDT, 579 F.3d at 999. 
136 See United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir. 1982). 
137 See United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A] search can 
be as much an art as a science.”); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 547 (2005) (“[D]ata acquisition refers to collecting the hay, and 
data reduction involves looking through the haystack for the needle.”). 
138 United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2006). 
139 Kerr, supra note 137, at 575 (“[M]agistrate judges are poorly equipped to evaluate 
whether a particular search protocol is the fastest and most targeted way of locating 
evidence stored on a hard drive.”). 
140 CDT, 579 F.3d at 995. 
141 Bohn & Muster, supra note 121, at 76–77. 
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The requirement of a specific search protocol also contradicts case 
law.  In Ex Parte United States, the Supreme Court stated that a 
district court or a magistrate is prohibited from imposing restrictions 
on the issuance of a warrant once it is established that probable cause 
exists.142  To require a specific protocol as a condition of the issuance 
of a warrant would be tantamount to requiring specificity in the 
manner of a warrant’s execution, which the Supreme Court has 
specifically stated is unnecessary.143  Rather, particularity is required 
only in describing the area to be searched and the evidence to be 
seized––“[n]othing in the language of the Constitution . . . suggests 
that, in addition to the requirements set forth in the text [of the Fourth 
Amendment], search warrants also must include a specification of the 
precise manner in which they are to be executed.”144 
C.  The “Wall” Requirement 
CDT also requires that the warrant application contain a provision 
prohibiting communication between the computer personnel and the 
investigators.145  This requirement fails to recognize the level of 
sophistication present in many investigations, which often “seek 
particular information to answer more general questions, such as who 
used a computer, when they did so, and the purpose and manner of 
that use.”146  Computer forensics requires not just a mechanical 
search process for easily identifiable documents but an intuitive, on-
the-spot judgment by the investigator of whether to pursue a 
particular avenue.  Thus, information that may not appear readily 
related to the investigation to computer personnel may actually 
present useful facts that are relevant to the case investigators.  This 
information can lead to other valuable information about a target’s 
connections, movements, and behaviors, or about the beginning or 
ongoing nature of a crime.  To connect the investigation to the 
seemingly innocuous material, the computer personnel must speak 
with the case agents lest important information be overlooked.  The 
Ninth Circuit, however, simply cuts off all contact, regardless of its 
nature or relevancy, and assumes that misconduct is universal. 
 
142 Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250 (1932); see also Goldstein, supra note 81. 
143 United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98 (2006). 
144 Id. (quoting Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)). 
145 CDT, 579 F.3d at 1000. 
146 Government’s Brief, supra note 86, at 15. 
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The “no communication” requirement also strains government 
resources.  For complicated cases, such as trafficking, fraud schemes, 
terrorism, and identity theft, compliance with the CDT guidelines 
would require that the segregating personnel become experts in the 
field of investigation.147  This step may take months of additional 
training to enable computer personnel to reach the level of familiarity 
that a case agent has spent a career developing.148  Additionally, the 
trained expert may not participate in the potentially ongoing 
investigation, which deprives case agents of the knowledge that the 
fully trained individual possesses.  In short, the requirement demands 
that labor be divided between computer personnel and investigating 
agents, and the lack of crossover between the two essentially requires 
at least one extra person for every case involving ESI evidence. 
The alternative suggested by the CDT decision is to farm out the 
segregation to a third party,149 but this option also fails to consider 
several pitfalls.  For instance, some materials may not be given to 
third parties.  The Adam Walsh Act, for instance, which states that 
“[i]n any criminal proceeding, any property or material that 
constitutes child pornography . . . shall remain in the care, custody, 
and control of either the Government or the court.”150  Giving child 
pornography to a third party not associated with the government 
would therefore violate federal law.  Furthermore, to fully understand 
the investigation and enable a reviewer to determine if information is 
responsive or not, other sorts of information may be needed.  Some of 
this may be inappropriate or illegal to disseminate outside of law 
enforcement, such as grand jury testimony,151 tax information,152 or 
the results of court-ordered wiretaps.153  Finally, evidence 
suppression, the traditional remedy for exceeding the scope of the 
 
147 Id. at 16. 
148 See id. at 6 (“[A]n FBI forensic examiner has advised that, to comply with the en 
banc decision’s rules, he will need many months to learn a complex national security case 
before attempting to segregate responsive and non-responsive data on a seized 
computer.”). 
149 See CDT, 579 F.3d at 1000 (“At the discretion of the issuing judicial officer, and 
depending on the nature and sensitivity of the privacy interests involved, the computer 
personnel in question may be government employees or independent third parties not 
affiliated with the government.”). 
150 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) (2006). 
151 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
152 See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(2) (2006). 
153 See 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2006). 
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warrant, seems illogical when the misconduct comes from a non-law 
enforcement examiner.  The CDT decision makes no mention of how 
this situation should be handled. 
Another issue with utilizing third-party examiners is cost.154  The 
dissent targets the increased expense required with either third-party 
examiners or the acquisition of new personnel, stating that “an agency 
would have to expand its personnel, likely at a significant cost, to 
include both computer specialists who could segregate data and 
forensic computer specialists who could assist in the subsequent 
investigation . . . .  Both of these options would force law 
enforcement agencies to incur great expense . . . .”155  The majority 
avoided this consideration, but the issue is real, and it threatens to 
further undermine already costly forensic practices.  In short, the 
“wall” requirement is undermined by legitimate concerns that the 
CDT decision makes no effort to address. 
D.  Cases Interpreting CDT 
Given the short time since the guidelines were announced, and the 
delay inherent in governmental response to them, there have been few 
decisions citing to CDT.  Of the few decisions released, though, not 
one has been eager to enforce or adopt the guidelines.  In United 
States v. Cerna, for instance, a court in the Northern District of 
California examined and rejected the defendant’s complaint that “the 
government’s search protocol . . . was inadequate.”156  There, the 
search protocol in the warrant “required the government to make ‘all 
reasonable efforts’ [to] mimimize[] exposure of irrelevant . . . or 
confidential files.”157  This was held to be “sufficiently tailored” to 
satisfy the CDT criteria, although the Court did not provide any 
insight into how it made that decision.158  This inadequate 
explanation of what CDT actually requires will likely prove to be a 
 
154 See, e.g., Global Digital Forensics, GlobalDigital Forensics FAQ, 
http://www.evestigate.com/Computer%20Forensics%20FAQ.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 
2010) (giving a price of $250–$350 per hour and a typical cost of $4500 for a fifteen-hour 
analysis). 
155 CDT, 579 F.3d 989, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Callahan, J., dissenting in part 
and concurring in part). 
156 United States v. Cerna, No. CR 08-0730 WHA, 2009 WL 5125920, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 21, 2009). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
 376 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89, 351 
recurring theme in lower court decisions given that there is so little 
indicia of intent in the CDT opinion.  Without a body of case law 
supporting the guidelines, lower courts cannot know the contours of 
the law; therefore, they will simply choose “yes” or “no,” without 
adequately explaining their decisions until that case law develops.159 
Another recent opinion held that the CDT guidelines are not 
immune from the good faith exception.160  In King, the court issued a 
warrant to search a defendant’s computer and peripherals for sex- 
trafficking evidence.161  The warrant contained search protocols, and 
nothing seized went beyond the immediate investigation or was used 
as the basis for additional charges.162  Nevertheless, the defendant 
asserted that the search did not explicitly comply with the CDT 
guidelines.163  In refuting the assertion, the court stated, “the 
exclusionary rule should not apply to evidence seized in honest 
compliance with a warrant that comports with the Fourth Amendment 
but does not include all of the ‘procedures’ outlined in CDT.”164  
Rather, the court took the view that the CDT guidelines are not 
necessarily based on the Fourth Amendment and should instead be 
viewed as best practices, and in any case, the good faith reliance on a 
warrant should preclude exclusion.165 
Other circuits have refused to apply the CDT guidelines when 
confronted with the seizure of electronically stored information.  In 
United States v. Mann, the Seventh Circuit criticized the decision and 
reiterated that the traditional remedy of suppression was 
appropriate.166  In that case, a detective searched two of the 
defendant’s computers on two separate occasions, separated by two 
months, for “images of women in locker rooms or other private 
 
159 Or until CDT is amended or vacated.  For another example, see United States v. 
Seldon, Nos. 09-10137, 09-10150, 2010 WL 2545897 (9th Cir. June 24, 2010), wherein 
the court states simply that the search procedures were complied with and the search did 
not move from “a limited search for particular information into a general search of office 
file systems and computer databases.”  Id. at *1 (quoting CDT, 579 F.3d at 998). 
160 See United States v. King, 693 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Haw. 2010). 
161 Id. at 1127. 
162 Id. 
163 Id.  Oddly, the opinion does not state what noncompliance occurred, and the 
“[d]efendant [did] not elucidate for the Court how the agents’ search in the instant case . . . 
did not comply with CDT or the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 1227. 
164 Id. at 1229–30. 
165 Id. at 1223–24, 1230. 
166 See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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areas.”167  In both searches, the detective employed a “forensic tool 
kit” to convert all the images into a viewable format, which included 
listing “Known File Filter (“KFF”) Alerts.”168  These KFF Alert files 
were flagged by the program because they matched files in a library 
of known contraband, mostly child pornography.169  Both searches 
returned these results, which was sufficient evidence to obtain a 
second search warrant (for child pornography), but the detective 
failed to do so.170  The defendant argued that the use of the child 
pornography images constituted an impermissible use of plain view 
and urged the court to apply the Ninth Circuit’s rationale to find the 
search unconstitutional.171  However, the court disagreed.  Instead, it 
was “inclined to find more common ground with the [CDT] dissent’s 
position,” and it noted that there was no Supreme Court or Ninth 
Circuit case law justifying the abandonment of the plain view 
doctrine.172  The court also stated that the better approach is “to allow 
the contours of the plain view doctrine to develop incrementally” 
through the normal adjudication process.173  Finally, they expressed 
skepticism about the need “to always obtain pre-approval . . . to use 
the electronic tools necessary to conduct searches tailored to 
uncovering evidence that is responsive to a properly circumscribed 
warrant.”174 
In United States v. Farlow, a case from the District of Maine, the 
CDT guidelines were also rejected in favor of the traditional 
suppression remedy.175  There, the search warrant authorized a search 
of electronic files for “evidence of the crimes of dissemination of 
indecent materials to minors or endangering the welfare of a 
 
167 Id. at 781.  The warrant specified that the search was for “video tapes, CD’s [sic] or 
other digital media, computers, and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other 
electronic media, to search for images of women in locker rooms or other private areas.”  
Id. at 780–81. 
168 Id. at 781. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 781–82. 
171 Id. at 785. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (quoting CDT, 579 F.3d 989, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Callahan, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
174 Id. 
175 United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 (D. Me. Dec. 
3, 2009). 
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child.”176  The defendant contended that the warrant was overbroad, 
but the court found otherwise, stating, “since the warrant stated the 
specific criminal activity likely to be found,” it did not amount to an 
authorization for a general search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment particularity requirement.177  The court then 
acknowledged that if the CDT guidelines had been applied here, the 
evidence of child pornography would not have been found.178  This is 
because the government would have been required to waive plain 
view and segregation of the responsive data would have screened out 
the child pornography.179  The Farlow court disagreed with the Ninth 
Circuit approach.  Instead, the court stated that: 
[T]he far preferable approach is to examine the circumstances of 
each case, to assess the validity of the computer search protocol, to 
determine whether the police strayed from the authorized 
parameters of the search warrant, and to hold the police to 
constitutional standards in the context of a motion to suppress.180 
Should the police conduct be found to be egregious, as it was in CDT, 
then “the Court can consider appropriate remedies,” such as 
suppression of some or all of the unconstitutionally seized 
evidence.181  In a lengthy footnote, the court continued to pick apart 
the CDT guidelines, stating, “CDT creates more problems than it 
solves.”182  The focus here is on the extreme limitations that the Ninth 
Circuit placed on searches that will undoubtedly hinder 
investigations.183  The court compared the relatively benign nature of 
the ill-gotten evidence in CDT (steroids) to the far more invidious 
evidence that plain view often uncovers (child pornography, 
terrorism).184  In the court’s view, the guidelines assume that 
 
176 Id. at *4. 
177 Id. at *4–5. 
178 Id. at *6. 
179 Id. (emphasis added). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at *6 n.3. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. (“The judicial directive to forswear in advance the plain view doctrine, placed in 
a different context, is equivalent to demanding that a DEA investigative team engaged in 
the search of a residence for drugs promise to ignore screams from a closet or a victim tied 
to a chair.”). 
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“misconduct will be the rule, not the exception” and that “at the very 
least the more traditional remedies should be tried first.”185 
Those courts that have utilized language from CDT to support a 
holding focus less on the guidelines and more on the Ninth Circuit’s 
assessment based on individuals’ rights.  For instance, in People v. 
Gutierrez, a Colorado state court advocated an individualized 
approach when assessing whether suppression was appropriate 
following a questionable search.186  In holding that probable cause 
was required for each individual involved in a search, the court used 
CDT as an example of an individualized approach to searches, stating 
that the expansion of the search from ten players to hundreds could 
not be justified based on probable cause for the original ten.187  
Similarly, in SK Foods, L.P. v. Sharp, the Eastern District of 
California used CDT only for the proposition that a reasonable 
expectation of privacy remains even if documents are intermingled.188  
This reluctance to adopt, or even endorse, the CDT guidelines 
illustrates the harsh reception of the sweeping reform demanded by 
the decision. 
V 
THE WAY FORWARD WITH A MEASURED APPROACH 
The idea that third-party searches require a higher standard has also 
been rejected by the Supreme Court because “[t]he Fourth 
Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public 
need.”189  Nevertheless, it is possible that a time has come where ESI 
is so prevalent and the risk of privacy invasion so high that a new 
approach is warranted.  Perhaps a third party who is not the target of 
an investigation, like the other players in CDT, should be afforded 
greater protections than the actual target; but if this is true, the CDT 
guidelines should have been restricted to those cases involving 
innocent third parties and not all ESI seizures.  In light of this, it 
 
185 Id. 
186 People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 940 (Colo. 2009) (en banc). 
187 Id. at 938. 
188 SK Foods, L.P. v. Sharp, No. 2:09-cv-02942-MCE, 2009 WL 5206639, at *3 (E.D. 
Cal. Dec. 24, 2009) (“Intermingling of documents, alone, does not waive Appellants’ 
constitutional rights.”). 
189 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978). 
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seems proper to vacate or remand the decision to address the issues 
that have emerged. 
A.  Proposed Methodologies 
Several commentators have suggested approaches that seek to 
safeguard innocent parties’ rights without compromising 
investigations.  One such approach was advanced by Orin Kerr.190  In 
his article, Kerr proposes an “exposure-based” approach that would 
distinguish between physical and virtual searches but adopts many of 
the traditional ideas of physical searches.191  While remaining open 
for evolution, the approach would limit or abandon the plain view 
doctrine192 and eliminate ex ante warrant limitations on the search 
processes.193  This acknowledges that computer searches are as much 
an art as a science and that the parties involved are not sophisticated 
enough to lay out a search protocol beforehand.194 
Alternatively, in direct response to the first CDT decision, Derek 
Regensburger advocated a different approach than the one advanced 
by Kerr.195  In his solution, Regensburger suggested that existing law 
should be made easily modifiable to accommodate the recent 
development of computers and ESI.196  To add sufficient protections, 
the approach requires that warrant requests to search ESI be based on 
specific assertions of necessity and not on vague or tangential 
relations to investigation.197  Once a warrant is obtained under this 
higher scrutiny, any storage media seized could be searched 
extensively, founded partially on the idea that there is no expectation 
 
190 See Kerr, supra note 137. 
191 Id. at 584–85. 
192 Id. at 566 (“Narrowing or even eliminating the plain view exception may eventually 
be needed to ensure that warrants to search computers do not become the functional 
equivalent of general warrants.”). 
193 Id. at 571–72 (“The ex ante strategy . . . wrongly assumes that prosecutors and 
magistrate judges have the knowledge needed to articulate search strategies before the 
search begins.  In truth, the forensics process is too contingent and unpredictable for 
judges to establish effective ex ante rules.”). 
194 Id. at 572. 
195 Derek Regensburger, Bytes, Balco, and Barry Bonds: An Exploration of the Law 
Concerning the Search and Seizure of Computer Files and an Analysis of the Ninth 
Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 97 CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1151 (2007). 
196 Id. at 1202. 
197 Id. 
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of privacy in criminal materials.198  Off-site searches should be 
utilized as they are more convenient for all parties.199  However, the 
approach also demands a different approach for searches of innocent 
third parties, such as businesses.  Here, the specific method of how 
the intermingled data will be separated must be detailed in the 
warrant, thereby taking no more than is necessary and avoiding 
wholesale removal of business computers.200  Like Kerr, 
Regensburger also expresses skepticism about the plain view 
exception and suggests that it be eliminated or curtailed for digital 
searches.201 
B.  Finding the Right Balance 
Both of the approaches advocated by Kerr and Regensburger are 
brilliantly thought out and deserve close scrutiny by courts confronted 
with these issues, but they each go too far in their limitations on the 
plain view doctrine.  Plain view has been a recognized exception for 
decades202 and is a crucial device in many investigations.203  Aside 
from the issues with the Ninth Circuit’s choosing to ignore the 
established doctrine,204 plain view provides an efficient and 
minimally invasive method to find inculpatory evidence.  Rather than 
requiring a waiver of plain view, courts should require that any 
evidence found in plain view during an ESI search be presented to the 
court via sworn affidavit by the examiner.  This would ensure that the 
initial search did not serve as mere pretext and that the material was 
reached in compliance with the exception’s requirements.205 
 
198 Id. at 1203. 
199 Id. at 1204. 
200 Id. at 1205. 
201 Id. at 1207. 
202 See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (holding a plain 
view seizure did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights). 
203 See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that child 
pornography found on a computer during a homicide investigation was in plain view). 
204 See supra Part III.C. 
205 See generally Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Separating Hard Fact from Hard Drive: A 
Solution for Plain View Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609 
(2010) (advocating for a balancing of society’s interests in public safety against the 
target’s justified expectation of privacy to determine if plain view is justified).  The 
approach put forth by Moshirnia is attractive in the example of CDT because it places the 
primary focus on the two actors the court seemed least concerned with in CDT: the target 
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It is also important that any approach to ESI searches have enough 
built-in flexibility to allow case agents to effectively communicate 
with computer personnel in order to facilitate an investigation.  This 
would enable seemingly innocuous but relevant data to be found 
much more easily.  To do this, the author proposes the “above and 
beyond” test.  This would shift the burden of proving compliance to 
the government when the following questions are answered in the 
affirmative: 
(1) Is the seized information related to the information sought in 
the warrant? 
(2) Is there reason to suspect that the warrant served as pretext? 
(3) Is the information above and beyond the warranted 
investigation such that the government significantly benefits from its 
discovery? 
This test would determine whether the nontargeted information 
was reached only as a result of pretext or was genuinely found 
innocently.  To do this, the court would review the seizure and decide 
whether the found information was within the context of the initial 
investigation.  If the area searched is related to the warrant but reveals 
additional information that is above and beyond the warrant but is 
also related to the investigation, the government should have to prove 
it came upon that information innocently.  This determination would 
consider file structure, the party’s culpability, the approved scope of 
the warrant, and any other relevant factors. 
In a case like CDT, the file structure was easily determined, the 
party was not inculpated in any way, the warrant was specifically 
tailored to reveal relevant information, and, perhaps most importantly, 
the information had already been sought in previous warrants.  
Accordingly, there should be a strong presumption that the additional 
incriminating materials were above and beyond the authorization of 
the warrant.  The government’s actions should have been seen, as 
they were by the court, as egregious and against the “spirit” of the 
warrant.  That is, the data taken were easily seen as the result of 
pretext and should be suppressed.  However, if the case agent had 
somehow stumbled upon evidence of fraud or illegal narcotic 
trafficking, this would be well outside the perceived goal of the 
investigation and not just above and beyond the warrant; therefore, it 
 
and society.  By avoiding a test that critiques government action directly, reckless searches 
are unlikely to be stymied. 
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should be allowed to support further prosecution.  To suppress such 
evidence that is obtained under established exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment seems overly burdensome. 
Although it could be argued that this is similar to the subjective 
inadvertence test, which has been rejected, it is more akin to other 
Fourth Amendment doctrines that ask whether an officer’s actions 
were objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances.  The 
Supreme Court has declined to examine an agent’s subjective intent 
and instead has focused on whether the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, justified the agent’s conduct.206 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit made some sweeping changes with the CDT 
decision, and the ramifications are still largely unknown.  However, 
the guidelines have certainly proved difficult, if not impossible, to 
follow.  Currently, the case is awaiting decision by the Ninth Circuit 
as to whether a full-court en banc rehearing should be held.  In the 
author’s view, this could only help both sides in the controversy: the 
government would get a legitimate opportunity to brief the issues not 
originally presented on appeal, and the court would get a chance to 
clarify some seemingly untenable positions.  In the meantime, 
prosecutors and magistrate judges are scrambling to find the contours 
of the guidelines.  Until those contours are determined, investigations 
will continue to be hampered by the current state of the law. 
ADDENDUM 
On September 13, 2010, the Ninth Circuit filed a per curiam 
opinion in the CDT case.207  In the opinion, the guidelines that were 
previously a part of the majority opinion penned by Chief Judge 
Kozinski have been relegated to a concurrence.208 
In his concurrence, which is joined by four other members of the 
eleven-judge panel, Judge Kozinski frames the guidelines as offering 
 
206 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (“An action is 
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of 
mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
207 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-
55354, 2010 WL 3529247 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2010). 
208 Id. at *16. 
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“the government a safe harbor, while protecting the people’s right to 
privacy and property in their papers and effects.”209  He goes on to 
say that “heeding this guidance will significantly increase the 
likelihood that the searches and seizures of electronic storage that 
[district and magistrate judges] authorize will be deemed reasonable 
and lawful.”210  The language used in defining the guidelines 
themselves is identical to that of the original opinion, and no effort is 
made to explain the new location beyond a claim that it is merely a 
restatement of current law.211 
The effect of the per curiam opinion is clear: the CDT guidelines 
are not binding on warrants authorizing ESI searches.  However, 
given the number of judges who joined in Kozinski’s concurrence and 
the stern recommendation that the guidance be followed in the future, 
it is likely that future ESI searches will still be subjected to the CDT 
guidelines in principle if not in fact. 
Practically, the Ninth Circuit has protected the CDT guidelines.  By 
placing them in a concurrence, and thereby not binding lower courts 
to their application, the court makes the issue moot on appeal.  The 
per curiam opinion fixes the major flaw in the original CDT decision, 
which was the overreaching represented by the guidelines.  Thus, the 
government is unlikely to seek certiorari with the Supreme Court.  
Even if certiorari were sought, the Supreme Court would be unlikely 
to grant it given the rather simple conclusion that the search was 
improper under current Fourth Amendment doctrine.  Without the 
guidelines to take issue with, there is simply nothing to be gained on 
appeal. 
The CDT drama is now likely to conclude.  In the end, the CDT 
guidelines will likely become another signpost in the journey to a 
coherent and fair application of the Fourth Amendment to ESI 
searches. 
 
 
209 Id. at *14. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at *16 (“This guidance is hardly revolutionary.  It’s essentially Tamura’s solution 
to the problem of necessary over-seizing of evidence.”).  Cynically, the prospect of a full 
panel en banc review likely motivated the court to reissue the opinion in its new form. 
